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MARRIAGE AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
ELIJAH L. MILNEt
INTRODUCTION
Both marriage and religion have commonly given rise to
differing degrees of conflict and controversy in various settings.
Indeed, many conflicts in marriages are sometimes over religion,
and many controversies in religions are sometimes about
marriage. It should come as no surprise then that the
contemporary debate over same-sex marriage and religious
liberty has effectually divided households and sanctuaries
throughout the nation.
While it is not the purpose of this Article to stoke the flames
of controversy, this Article does attempt to explain and clarify a
handful of narrow topics in the modern debate over same-sex
marriage which concern the intersection of religion with
marriage. Due to the vast array of issues involved in this debate,
however, the topics addressed in this Article are only considered
in the context of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution.' These topics include such
things as the historical relationship of marriage and religion, the
legality of defining marriage as the union of one man and one
woman, the propriety of religious leaders solemnizing civil
marriages, the possible effects on religious liberty of either
legalizing or prohibiting same-sex marriage, and the continuing
significance of marriage for families and religions of all stripes.2
I The author thanks Professor Kent Greenawalt, the participants in his Seminar
on Church and State at Columbia Law School, and Professor Joel A. Nichols for
reviewing and commenting on previous drafts of this Article. Thanks also to
Megan-for everything.
'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2 This Article takes no position on the advisability or merits of either banning or
embracing same-sex marriage. Nor does its discussion of the legality of same-sex
unions address arguments beyond those arising out of the Religion Clauses of the
First Amendment. Rather, this Article only addresses the legality of same-sex
marriages under the Religion Clauses.
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The layout of this Article in addressing these topics is as
follows: First, Part I chronicles the origins and history of
marriage in America. Next, Part II explores whether defining
marriage to be the union of a man and a woman constitutes an
unlawful establishment of religion. Part III then addresses
questions involving the religious solemnization of marriage and
the possible effects on religious liberty of legalizing same-sex
marriage. Part IV analyzes whether refusing to recognize same-
sex marriages unlawfully impairs religious liberty. And, finally,
Part V provides brief remarks on the continuing significance of
marriage for families and religions in America.
I. CHRONICLING MARRIAGE
Marriage is ancient. Exactly when it began is unknown. It
seems to predate all existent civilizations, religions, and political
systems.' It may even be older than mankind.' Although its
nature has often varied, for more than a millennium western
civilizations have understood it primarily to be the union of one
man and one woman as husband and wife.'
Intimate same-sex relationships have also existed
throughout the world in various forms, including marriage, since
time immemorial.' There is, however, little evidence that same-
sex marriages were ever abundant in the West during the last
3 The brief historical overview of marriage outlined in this Article is, of
necessity, somewhat simplistic. For a more thorough and detailed history of
marriage in both England and the United States, see generally GEORGE ELLIOTT
HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS (1904) (three volumes).
4 See STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: HOW LOVE CONQUERED
MARRIAGE 24 (2006) (noting that, with only one known exception, "marriage has
been, in one form or another, a universal social institution throughout recorded
history").
6 See 1 EDWARD WESTERMARCK, THE HISTORY OF HUMAN MARRIAGE 19-25, 35-
38 (5th ed. 1922) (suggesting that the concept of marriage predates the evolution of
homo sapiens). But see COONTZ, supra note 4, at 24-26.
6 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: FROM
SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT 23-27, 35-37 (1996). This
understanding generally tracks the traditional Christian view of marriage. See
NANCY F. Corr, PUBLIC VOws: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9-11
(2000).
7 See COONTZ, supra note 4, at 27, 31; ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 17-35; RITA J.
SIMON & HOWARD ALTSTEIN, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL ISSUES: MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE 13 (2003).
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1,000 years or so.8 Instead, the evidence suggests that, beginning
in the first two or four centuries of this era and continuing until
relatively recently, western societies steadily became more
intolerant of intimate same-sex relations.' And by the thirteenth
century, Europe as a whole was quite decisively opposed to all
homosexual relations."o
The growth and spread of Christianity over the last two
millennia no doubt contributed to this state of antipathy towards
sexual diversity." Christians considered homosexual intimacy to
be sinful and unnatural." Many also considered heterosexual
intimacy to be sinful, especially in cases of adultery, fornication,
incest, polygamy, and prevention of conception. 13
Although marriage has had religious significance for many
people throughout time, it was not until the thirteenth century of
the present era that the Catholic Church formally declared
monogamous Christian marriages to be one of seven sanctifying
symbolic sacraments. 14  As a sacrament, marriage became
subjected to the Church's legal jurisdiction and regulation.'"
Consequently, the Church declared that any marriage entered
into without the Church's blessing was improper."
During the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, religious reformers rejected the Catholic
view of marriage as a sacrament, although they still maintained
8 ESKRIDGE, supra note 6; SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 7; see COONTZ, supra
note 4, at 28 ("Throughout history and across the globe the huge majority of
marriages have been between heterosexuals, even in societies where same-sex
marriages have the same legitimacy as heterosexual marriages.").
9 ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 23-24.
10 Id. at 35-36; SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 7.
n1 ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 24-25, 35-37.
12 Id. at 35; E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 53, 59-63 (1999); JOHN
WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION, AND LAW IN THE
WESTERN TRADITION 4, 18-19 (1997).
13 See GRAFF, supra note 12; WITE, supra note 12, at 4, 18-22, 27.
14 WITTE, supra note 12, at 3-4, 22-23, 26-30; WESTERMARCK, supra note 5, at
421-30 (discussing the "religious character" of marriage in different traditions); see
GRAFF, supra note 12, at 196. The belief that marriage is a sacrament may have
found expression in Christianity long before the thirteenth century. See
WESTERMARCK, supra note 5, at 427 (noting the Latin Vulgate's rendition of St.
Paul's words in Ephesians 5:32 about marriage, "[slacramentum hoc magnum est").
Compare Ephesians 5:32 (Wycliffe) ("This sacrament is great . . . ."), with Ephesians
5:32 (King James) (interpreting this same phrase as "Itihis is a great mystery").
15 WITTE, supra note 12, at 3-4, 23, 30-36.
16 WESTERMARCK, supra note 5, at 428.
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that marriage was a divinely appointed institution." As John
Witte Jr. has explained, Lutherans considered marriage to be an
earthly and social construct that was largely under the control of
the state-rather than of the church and its courts." Calvinists
viewed marriage as a covenant needing both religious and state
regulation.'9  And Anglicans saw marriage as a "little
commonwealth" that was under the authority of the church and
its ecclesiastical courts-both of which were, in turn, subordinate
to the English Crown.20
This latter view of marriage, which Witte refers to as the
Anglican commonwealth model, eventually became part of the
English common law.2 ' It considered marriage to be a part of a
natural and divine system of government, wherein the English
King was superior to the established Church of England, the
Church was superior to individual households, husbands-as
heads of household-were superior to their wives, and parents
were superior to their children.22 A husband's legal supremacy
over his wife and children was a product of the common-law
doctrine of coverture, pursuant to which a wife's rights, body,
name, and possessions became and were subsumed into those of
her husband. 23  As Nancy F. Cott has explained, coverture
"turned the married pair legally into one person-the husband."24
Although England's American colonies consisted of
numerous religious dissenters opposed to the Anglican faith, each
of whom also had their own views about the nature of marriage,
all of the colonies eventually adopted the common law of their
mother country, including its marriage laws-like coverture.2 5
" Id.; WITTE, supra note 12, at 4-5, 42-44.
1s WITTE, supra note 12, at 4-6, 48-53; see SIMON & ALTSTEIN, supra note 7, at
7.
1' WITTE, supra note 12, at 5, 7-8, 94-100.
20 Id. at 5, 8-10, 165-79.
21 Mary Lyndon Shanley, The State of Marriage and the State in Marriage: What
Must Be Done, in MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS 188, 190
(Anita Bernstein ed., 2006); see COTT, supra note 6, at 10-13.
22 WITTE, supra note 12, at 9, 131-32, 165-76.
23 COTT, supra note 6, at 11-12.
24 Id. at 11; see COONTZ, supra note 4, at 142 ("[A husband] could force sex upon
[his wife], beat her, and imprison her in the family home, while .. . she ... endowed
him with all her worldly goods.").
25 Charles P. Kindregan, Jr., Same-Sex Marriage: The Cultural Wars and the
Lessons of Legal History, 38 FAM. L.Q. 427, 430 (2004); see NANCY D. POLIKOFF,
1454 [Vol. 85:1451
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Unlike England, however, the predominantly Protestant colonies
in America generally did not create ecclesiastical courts to
oversee sexual and marital matters, even though they continued
to consider marriage to be a divine institution.2 6
For this reason, civil authorities typically had greater direct
rein over sexual and marital matters in America than was the
case in England.2 7 And while the clergy regularly continued to
perform marriages in the colonies, the state maintained the right
to oversee all marital, sexual, and familial affairs.28
The hierarchical structure of English government and
marriage gradually changed. 29 Because of the revolutions of 1640
to 1689 in England and the subsequent dawn of the
Enlightenment throughout the West, English conceptions of
marriage and government slowly became more democratic on
both sides of the Atlantic. 0 For Enlightenment thinkers like
John Locke, government was a voluntary social contract and
marriage was a voluntary familial one." Although the
contractual nature of marriage had long been recognized,
proponents of the Enlightenment declared the essence of
marriage to be contractual, rather than sacramental, covenantal,
biblical, or patriarchal.3 2 According to this "contractarian" model
of marriage, people who entered into a marital contract did so
freely as equal individuals, with full power to negotiate its terms
and the unbridled right to rescind it if they later so desired."
The state, upon petition of either or both of the parties, could
only enforce the contract's terms.34
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 12
(2008).
26 Kindregan, supra note 25; see Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition:
Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 MD. L. REV. 540, 543 (2004).
27 Estin, supra note 26.
28 See id.; FAY BOTHAM, ALMIGHTY GOD CREATED THE RACES: CHRISTIANITY,
INTERRACIAL MARRIAGE, & AMERICAN LAW 79-82 (2009).
29 WITTE, supra note 12, at 133-34.
so COTT, supra note 6, at 14; WITTE, supra note 12, at 9-11, 130-34, 176, 196-
97.
WITTE, supra note 12, at 186-93.
2 See Corr, supra note 6, at 11; WITTE, supra note 12, at 9-11, 196-97.
3 WITTE, supra note 12, at 11, 188-93.
34 COONTZ, supra note 4, at 146-47; WITrE, supra note 12, at 10-11, 188-93,
196-97.
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In time, these ideas of the Enlightenment-emphasizing
liberty, equality, individuality, reason, and freedom of contract-
revolutionized the nature of marriage and family life in
America." More immediately, however, they revolutionized
America itself.36  Not only did they serve as the moral
justification for waging the Revolutionary War against England,
but they also provided the philosophical underpinnings for the
new nation's founding documents, including the Declaration of
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the United
States Constitution."
Although one of the Constitution's stated objectives is to
"insure domestic Tranquility," this provision obviously has
little-if anything-to do with household notions of domesticity,
such as marriage and divorce. In fact, the Constitution
generally reserves to the several states the right to regulate
marriage and family matters.39 Questions of marriage without
the jurisdiction of the states, however, are entirely different. The
regulation of marriage and divorce within the country's
territories, for instance, are subject to Congress's exclusive
jurisdiction. It was Congress's exercise of this right to regulate
marital affairs within the territories during the nineteenth
century that ultimately gave rise to the nation's first widespread
debate over the intersection of marriage, religion, and the
Constitution.
Intent on quashing the religious practice of Mormon
polygamy in the western territories, Congress passed the nation's
first federal statute outlawing polygamy in 1862." Efforts to
3 COONTZ, supra note 4, at 145-47; COTT, supra note 6, at 14-17.
6 COTT, supra note 6, at 14-16.
3 See JACK N. RAKOvE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE
MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 18-19 (1996).
8 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
3 See id. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States ... are
reserved to the States . . . .").
40 See id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States. . . .").
41 Elijah L. Milne, Blaine Amendments and Polygamy Laws: The
Constitutionality of Anti-Polygamy Laws Targeting Religion, 28 W. NEW ENG. L.
REV. 257, 265-66 (2006); see Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12
Stat. 501 (1862) (repealed 1978). It may be noted that the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act
appears to fall squarely within that provision of the Constitution which prohibits
Congress from passing any "Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law." U.S. CONST. art.
[Vol. 85:14511456
MARRIAGE AND THE RELIGION CLAUSES
enforce this anti-polygamy law in what was then the territory of
Utah eventually led to the United States Supreme Court case of
Reynolds v. United States-one of the Court's earliest published
opinions on freedom of religion. 42  Although acknowledging that
"[r]eligious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the
United States," the Court in Reynolds concluded that Congress is
only deprived of power under the Constitution to regulate mere
opinions, but not of power to control actions.43 In addition, the
Court also found that marriage is, "in most civilized nations, a
civil contract, and usually regulated by law."" Given this state of
law and fact, together with the Court's views on the "odious"
nature of polygamy, the Court did not hesitate to sustain the
statute at issue in Reynolds."
I, § 9, cl. 3; see L. Rex Sears, Punishing the Saints for Their "Peculiar Institution":
Congress on the Constitutional Dilemmas, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 581, 606-07 (2001)
(observing the same). A bill of attainder is a "legislative act prescribing [capital]
punishment, without a trial" for a person guilty of a high offense. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 188 (9th ed. 2009). Similar to a bill of attainder is a bill of pains and
penalties, the only difference between the two being that the latter "prescribes
punishment less severe than capital punishment." Id. at 189. The Constitution's ban
on bills of attainder has been interpreted as extending to bills of pains and penalties.
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 277, 323 (1866). A bill of attainder may, but need
not, also constitute an ex post facto law. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 536-37
(2000). An ex post facto law is one "that impermissibly applies retroactively, esp. in a
way that negatively affects a person's rights, as by criminalizing an action that was
legal when it was committed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 661. To the
extent the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act sought to punish-or had the effect of
punishing-individuals who may have entered into a polygamous relationship prior
to the date the Morrill Anti-Bigamy Act was passed, it could be seen as an ex post
facto law since there were no previously existing federal anti-polygamy laws in
place. And to the extent it directly targeted Mormons-on its face or as applied-it
may have been a bill of pains and penalties too. See §§ 2-3, 12 Stat. at 501 (singling
out "spiritual marriage," dissolving The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
and seeking to have that organization's real property escheat to the United States).
For additional evidence that Congress did in fact intend its anti-polygamy legislation
primarily to target Mormons and that it had the effect of so doing, see Milne, supra,
at 265-71.
42 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Court's opinion in Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679
(1871), a church property case decided under federal common law, concerns religious
freedom and predates Reynolds.
4 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162, 164, 166.
44 Id. at 165 (emphasis added). Apparently included among the Court's
conception of "civilized nations" were "the northern and western nations of Europe."
Id. at 164. Expressly excluded from this category, however, were "Asiatic
and ... African people." Id.
4 Id. at 164, 166.
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As emphasis on the contractual nature of marriage
continued to grow unabated throughout the nineteenth century,
both before and after Reynolds, many prior conceptions of
marriage were gradually modified and discarded. Common law
doctrines associated with marriage, such as coverture, became
increasingly distasteful. 46 Notions of marriage legally merging
two people into one became less palatable.4 7 Beliefs that a
person's individuality and property remained unchanged and
unchecked following marriage became more widespread. 8 And
when the nineteenth century finally ended, "Married Women's
Property Acts" abolishing coverture and allowing wives to control
their own separate property were firmly in place throughout the
country.49
As America progressed into the twentieth century, the
momentum with which the "contractarian" model of marriage
garnered widespread acceptance and support continued to
accelerate. Because this model envisioned marriage as an
egalitarian partnership that individuals voluntarily created for
the purpose of satisfying their unique wants and desires, many
Americans began to believe that marital partners should be
permitted to dissolve their union if, for whatever reason, they
were no longer satisfied with their contractual relationship.50
Consequently, as dissatisfaction with(in) marriages seemingly
became more prevalent in the United States, prenuptial and
postnuptial agreements proliferated, no-fault divorce laws
multiplied, and the nation's divorce rate skyrocketed.5
Americans did not only flock to exit marriage. Increasingly,
they also avoided entering into it altogether, choosing instead to
cohabit under living arrangements devoid of marital trappings.5 2
As the stability, durability, and popularity of marriage waned,
" See WITTE, supra note 12, at 195-98, 202-15.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 10-11.
4 Elijah L. Milne, Recharacterizing Separate Property at Divorce, 84 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 307, 309-10 (2007).
50 See WITTE, supra note 12, at 10-12.
ex Id. at 211-13; see LEE WALZER, MARRIAGE ON TRIAL: A HANDBOOK WITH
CASES, LAWS, AND DOCUMENTS 32 (2005).
52 For a short but thoughtful discussion on the disintegration of marriage and
the family over the past several decades, see INST. FOR AM. VALUES & INST. FOR
MARRIAGE AND PUB. POLICY, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES
(2006).
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notions of individuality, autonomy, and privacy correspondingly
waxed more sacrosanct. This changing reality also found
expression in United States Supreme Court decisions. In a series
of opinions handed down during the latter twentieth century and
extending somewhat into the twenty-first, the Court established
and defined a constitutional right to privacy involving matters of
marriage and sexuality. In doing so, the Court consistently
reaffirmed the inviolability of individual liberty while
invalidating infringements of it, including bans on
contraceptives, abortions, interracial marriages, and sodomy.5 3
Encouraged by these changing legal and societal norms,
people across the country started to express their sexual
preferences more openly.' As they did so, however, intolerance
and discrimination frequently followed. Consequently, when
police raided a gay bar at the Stonewall Inn in New York City's
Greenwich Village during the summer of 1969, a long-suppressed
community protested, riots ensued, and the gay-liberation
movement began.5
Efforts to secure the legal recognition of gay rights in
America have, from the beginning, been fraught with opposition.
When, for instance, Hawaii appeared during the 1990s to be on
the cusp of becoming the first state to legalize same-sex
marriages, Congress quickly responded by passing the federal
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). 6 For purposes of federal law,
DOMA defines marriage as "a legal union between one man and
one woman as husband and wife."" It similarly defines spouse as
1 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003) (sodomy); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (abortion), overruled in part by Gonzales v.
Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), and Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (miscegenation); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (contraceptives); see also Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U.S. 374, 383-84, 387 (1978) (holding the right to marry to be a fundamental
right); Shanley, supra note 21, at 191-94.
" See ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 42-46; WALZER, supra note 51, at 44-45.
5 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 6, at 44-45; WALZER, supra note 51, at 45. The
Mattachine Society is said to be "the first public gay organization of the
contemporary social movement." MARTIN DupuIS, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, LEGAL
MOBILIZATION, & THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 14 (2002).
5 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); see
Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993) (holding that a state law prohibiting
same-sex marriage is subject to strict scrutiny under the state constitution),
superseded by constitutional amendment, Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 (1998).
57 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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"a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."58 In
order to prevent a state from having to recognize a same-sex
marriage performed elsewhere, DOMA also provides that states
may refuse "to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other State ... respecting a relationship
between persons of the same sex."59
Following DOMNA's lead, states throughout the country began
to amend their respective constitutions and promulgate
legislation prohibiting the recognition and performance of same-
sex marriages within their jurisdictions.6 0 By January 2010,
twenty-nine states reportedly had provisions in their
constitutions banning same-sex marriages, while an additional
twelve others relied upon legislation alone for this same
purpose."' Notwithstanding these efforts to thwart the spread of
same-sex marriages, proponents of gay and lesbian rights have
successfully secured the right to marry a person of the same-sex
in Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
York, Vermont, and the District of Columbia.6 2 They have also
" Id. At present, DOMA's future appears bleak. On February 23, 2011, the
Obama administration announced that it will no longer defend DOMA in court
because it believes the statute to be unconstitutional. See Charlie Savage & Sheryl
Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2011, at Al.
5 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
60 WALZER, supra note 51, at 47. Efforts were also made during the first decade
of the twenty-first century to amend the federal Constitution so as to uniformly
preserve the "traditional" definition of marriage across the country as being the
union of one man and one woman. See id. at 48.
61 Statewide Marriage Prohibitions, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/files/assets/resources/marriage-prohibitions_2009(1).pdf (last
updated Jan. 13, 2010). This report lists the following twenty-nine states as having
provisions in their constitutions limiting marriage to one man and one woman:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Kansas, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. In addition to these
twenty-nine states, this report lists the following twelve states as also having laws
restricting marriage to one man and one woman: Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington,
West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. On May 8, 2012, the citizens of North Carolina also
elected to add a provision to their state's constitution banning same-sex marriage.
Campbell Robertson, Ban on Gay Marriage Passes in North Carolina, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 2012, at A15.
62 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., EQUALITY FROM STATE TO STATE 2010: A
REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION IN 2010 AFFECTING THE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
AND TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY, AND A LOOK AHEAD TO 2011 13 (2011). These
[Vol. 85:14511460
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procured legal recognition in Maryland of same-sex marriages
performed in other jurisdictions.6 3 And they have won rights for
same-sex couples equivalent to those of married persons in
California, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, and Washington."
Although people of faith are found on both sides of the
modern debate over legalizing same-sex marriages, religious
conservatives are frequently seen as the primary opponents of
efforts to legally recognize same-sex unions in America." Many
of those in this latter group who oppose same-sex marriage do so
as a result of their religious conviction that homosexuality is
sinful and that sexual relations are appropriate only between a
man and a woman who are joined together in marriage. Given
this reality, much of the contemporary debate over same-sex
marriage increasingly seems to touch on matters involving
religion and religious liberty.
successes have generally been the result of litigation rather than independent
legislation. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481-82
(Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dep't
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003); see also In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993), superseded
by constitutional amendment, Haw. Const. art. I, § 23 (1998); Lewis v. Harris, 908
A.2d 196, 221 (N.J. 2006); Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). But see
Nicholas Confessore & Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage,
Becoming Largest State To Pass Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2011, at Al (same-sex
marriages legalized by legislation in New York); Tim Craig et al., Message Appended
to Marriage Bill, WASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 2009, at B01 (same-sex marriages legalized
by legislation in D.C.). The legality of same-sex marriages in California is, at
present, uncertain. See generally Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir.
2011) (briefly summarizing the legal and political battles regarding same-sex
marriages in California).
6 HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., supra note 62; Douglas F. Gansler,
Whether Out-of-State Same-Sex Marriage That Is Valid in the State of Celebration
May Be Recognized in Maryland, 95 Md. OP. ATT'Y GEN. 3-4 (2010), available at
http://www.oag.state.md.us/Opinions/2010/95oag3.pdf.
" HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., supra note 62. Some marriage-like rights
have also been awarded to same-sex couples in Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. Id.
65 See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Contextualizing Varnum v. Brien: A "Moment" in
History, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 27, 47-48 (2009) ("There is a high correlation
between religious beliefs and opposition to same-sex marriage. People who are very
religious find it difficult to separate civil marriage from religious marriage.")
(footnotes omitted).
6 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, MORAL CONTROVERSY, AND
THE SUPREME COURT 125-27 (2009).
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II. DEFINING MARRIAGE
The legal preservation of the so-called "traditional" meaning
of marriage, which defines marriage as the union of only one man
and one woman, is considered by many people to be an unlawful
establishment of religion in contravention of the intent of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution.6 7 The First
Amendment provides, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof."" In addition to restricting
the powers of Congress, the two clauses comprising this
provision-referred to respectively as the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause-have also been construed as
applying equally to all other branches and systems of
government in the United States, including state governments.
Claims that legally restricting marriage to its conventional
definition unlawfully establishes religion in contravention of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment are often based
upon the fact that this definition conforms to Christian
conceptions of marriage. 0  The historical influence of
Christianity in shaping marital norms and forms throughout the
United States is well documented and generally undisputed.
Given the great diversity of religions and opinions in American
society today, continuing to legally define marriage in accordance
with customary Christian teachings is seen by many people as
being a means of improperly exalting and imposing the religious
67 Id.; DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO
LAWRENCE AND BEYOND 108-09, 169 (2005); Nancy Kubasek & Christy M. Glass, A
Case Against the Federal Protection of Marriage Amendment, 16 TEX. J. WOMEN & L.
1, 23, 25 (2006); Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537,
546, 553 (2007); Monte Neil Stewart, Marriage Facts, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
313, 334-35 (2008); Dov Berger, Note, Separating Civil Unions and Religious
Marriage-A New Paradigm for Recognizing Same-Sex Relationships, 6 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 163, 182 (2007); Misha Isaak, Comment, "What's In a
Name?": Civil Unions and the Constitutional Significance of "Marriage", 10 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 607, 631 (2008).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the First
Amendment to the states); see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh
Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) ("[No government official in this Nation may
violate these fundamental constitutional rights regarding matters of conscience.").
7o See, e.g., Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J.
SOC. POL'Y & L. 307, 329-31 (2004).
n1 See, e.g., COrr, supra note 6, at 9-23; supra text accompanying notes 10-26.
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preferences of one group over and upon all others." This,
according to such people, is inconsistent with both the spirit and
the letter of the Establishment Clause.
Regardless of what the "original intent" of the Establishment
Clause may have once been, the United States Supreme Court
has repeatedly interpreted it as erecting "a wall of separation
between Church and State."73 This wall, however, has not been
rendered completely impregnable." Given that a certain degree
of interaction between church and state is generally considered
inevitable, the Court has declared that the Establishment Clause
does not mandate absolute separation between government and
religion. 5 With that said, the precise amount of separation that
the Establishment Clause does require has not been-and
probably cannot ever be-conclusively determined." As a result,
the Court has simply provided some "helpful signposts" to guide
those who may seek to chart the difficult course of church-and-
state (ir)relations." Included among the markers that the Court
has given to indicate the constitutionality of a statute under the
Establishment Clause are inquiries into whether the statute has
a "secular ... purpose," whether its principal or primary effect
"neither advances nor inhibits religion," and whether it fosters
"an excessive government entanglement with religion."7 ' The
general principle underlying each of these questions often seems
to be the need to maintain governmental "neutrality" between
religions and with respect to believers and non-believers.
" See supra note 67.
1 See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). For a brief discussion of one suggested
interpretation of the "original meaning" of the Establishment Clause, see Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425-36 (1962).
1 See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14 (1952). But see Bd. of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 254 (1968) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should
"keep the wall of separation between church and state high and impregnable").
16 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397
U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970).
7 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 392-93 (1983).
77 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("the factors
identified in Lemon serve as 'no more than helpful signposts'" (quoting Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973)).
78 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674) (citations omitted).
7 See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) ("[Tlhe purpose of
ensuring governmental neutrality in matters of religion" is "perhaps the central
purpose of the Establishment Clause."); Walz, 397 U.S. at 669-70 (mandating
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Although each of these principles and "signposts" are
relevant to the present discussion, they shall be addressed in
greater detail at later points throughout this Article. For now,
observe that other factors may also be relevant to the issue at
hand, such as the relative antiquity and ubiquity of sex-based
limitations on marriage in American history.0 Male-female
marriage was the general legal standard in America long before
the Establishment Clause came into being.' And it continued to
be so until about nine years ago, when Massachusetts became the
first state in the country to authorize the performance of same-
sex marriages.82 While the longevity of a practice alone is rarely
sufficient to establish its constitutionality, the fact that legally
limiting marriage to persons of the opposite sex predates the
Establishment Clause and has been widespread throughout the
nation's history "is not something to be lightly cast aside."" For
as Justice Holmes observed nine decades ago, "[i]f a thing has
been practiced for two hundred years by common consent, it will
need a strong case for the Fourteenth Amendment to affect
it. .. ."8 This is undoubtedly no less true with respect to the
First Amendment, which is, in any event, only rendered
applicable to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reliance upon history, however, may be a two-edged sword.
If, for instance, the argument is that conventional sex-based
limitations on marriage establish religion because they
historically conform to and are a product of Christian theology
and teachings, then relying upon the history of marriage may
"[a]dherence to the policy of neutrality"); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 314 ("[Glovernment
must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects."); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) ( "[Tihe state [must] be a neutral in its relations with
groups of religious believers and non-believers. . . ."). See generally Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (focusing consistently on neutrality).
80 See COTT, supra note 6, at 9-23.
81 Id.
82 See supra notes 56-64 and accompanying text.
83 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 678 ("It is obviously correct that no one acquires a
vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that
span of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it. Yet an
unbroken practice . .. openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state
inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside."); see also Cnty. of Allegheny v.
ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 602-05 (1989).
" Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22, 31 (1922).
8 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 678-79 (quoting from and relying upon Holmes's
statement in an Establishment Clause context).
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end up actually supporting this contention. This contention is,
after all, premised upon the history of marriage. Further
reliance upon history is, therefore, unlikely to weaken or refute
it.
Be that what it may, even if the argument that traditional
limitations on marriage conform to religious tenets is
unassailable, that does not mean that they violate the
Establishment Clause. As the Supreme Court explained almost
fifty years ago in McGowan v. Maryland, a law is not invalid
simply because its purpose or effect conforms with religious
teachings:
[Tihe 'Establishment' Clause does not ban federal or state
regulation of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to
coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all
religions. ... Thus, for temporal purposes, murder is illegal.
And the fact that this agrees with the dictates of the Judaeo-
Christian religions while it may disagree with others does not
invalidate the regulation. So too with the questions of adultery
and polygamy. The same could be said of theft, fraud, etc.,
because those offenses were also proscribed in the Decalogue.86
Like laws related to adultery and polygamy, laws limiting
marriage to one man and one woman do not violate the
Establishment Clause simply because they are consistent with
religious teachings.
Nor do traditional limitations on marriage offend the
Establishment Clause simply because they can trace their origins
to religion. Many other aspects of American society also have
roots in religion, although they are not necessarily considered to
be religious today. Hence, while the Sunday Closing Laws at
issue in McGowan "had their genesis in religion" several
"centuries ago," the Court found them to be constitutional
because their "present purpose and effect . .. is to provide a
uniform day of rest for all citizens" which is "wholly apart from
their original purposes or connotations."87 And while the
celebrations of Chanukah and Christmas historically began as
religious holy days, the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU
held that they are now also commonly seen as secular holidays
' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
8 Id. at 445.
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which government may celebrate." Why customary limitations
on marriage should be treated any differently from the Sunday
laws in McGowan or the holiday celebrations in County of
Allegheny is not readily apparent, for they too can plausibly be
attributed to secular purposes wholly unrelated to their religious
origins even though they may continue to have religious
significance for some people in society. Simply having religious
origins, significance, or aspects should not alone render them
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause.
Numerous secular purposes have been alleged in support of
laws limiting marriage to male-female relationships. Some
claim, for instance, that conjugal marriages promote mental and
physical health, while same-sex relationships "place [their]
participants at risk for mental illness and physical disease."90
Others likewise argue that traditional marriages benefit women
and children, while same-sex unions harm women, children, and
father-child relationships.' And still others contend that
" Onty. of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 616-
18 (1989).
89 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 690 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("Of
course, the Ten Commandments are religious-they were so viewed at their
inception and so remain. The monument, therefore, has religious significance.
According to Judeo-Christian belief, the Ten Commandments were given to Moses by
God on Mt. Sinai. But Moses was a lawgiver as well as a religious leader. And the
Ten Commandments have an undeniable historical meaning, as the foregoing
examples demonstrate. Simply having religious content or promoting a message
consistent with a religious doctrine does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause."
(emphasis added)); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) ("Lemon requires first that the
law at issue serve a 'secular legislative purpose.' This does not mean that the law's
purpose must be unrelated to religion-that would amount to a requirement 'that the
government show a callous indifference to religious groups,' and the Establishment
Clause has never been so interpreted." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
90 A. Dean Byrd, Conjugal Marriage Fosters Healthy Human and Societal
Development, in WHAT's THE HARM? DOES LEGALIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE REALLY
HARM INDIVIDUALS, FAMILIES OR SOCIETY? 3, 18 (Lynn D. Wardle ed., 2008)
[hereinafter WHAT'S THE HARM?].
91 See Jason S. Carroll & David C. Dollahite, "Who's My Daddy?" How the
Legalization of Same-Sex Partnerships Would Further the Rise of Ambiguous
Fatherhood in America, in WHAT'S THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 47, 62; Lynne
Marie Kohm, What's the Harm to Women and Children? A Prospective Analysis, in
WHAT'S THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 79, 91.
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conventional marriages benefit society, while same-sex marriages
destabilize family structures, decrease birth and marriage rates,
and diminish social morality."
Each of these arguments defending traditional concepts of
marriage is, obviously, extremely controversial and open to
debate. Whether or not they are persuasive or accurate is
irrelevant for purposes of this Article, and this Article takes no
position on any of them. What is important for purposes of this
Article is to note that entirely secular bases can be reasonably
asserted in support of laws seeking to preserve customary legal
conceptions of marriage. Given this reality, the religious origins
and aspects that some people attribute to traditional limitations
on marriage should not diminish their constitutionality under
the Establishment Clause because wholly secular purposes can
also be reasonably attributed to them."
III. SOLEMNIZING MARRIAGE
Unlike many places in the world, statutes in every state of
the United States authorize religious leaders to solemnize or
perform legally binding marriages.9 4 In doing this, many
2 See Allan Carlson, Equality or Ideology? Same-Sex Unions in Scandinavia, in
WHAT'S THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 263, 271-72; Scott FitzGibbon, The Principles
of Justice in Procreative Affiliations, in WHAT'S THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 125,
141-42; Marianne M. Jennings, Unintended Consequences: The Flaws in "It Doesn't
Affect Anyone But Us" Argument in Favor of Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, in
WHAT'S THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 69, 73-75; Seana Sugrue, The Erosion of
Marriage: A Pyrrhic Victory?, in WHAT'S IN THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 297, 300-
10; Lynn D. Wardle, The Morality of Marriage and the Transformative Power of
Inclusion, in WHAT'S THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 207, 227.
" See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (noting the Court's
"reluctance to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states, particularly when a
plausible secular purpose for the state's program may be discerned from the face of
the statute"); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961) ("A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it.").
9 ALA. CODE § 30-1-7 (2011); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 25.05.261 (West 2010); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-124 (2011) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-213 (West 2011);
CAL. FAM. CODE § 400 (West 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109 (West 2011);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-22 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 106 (West
2011); D.C. CODE § 46-406 (2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.07 (West 2011); GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-30 (West 2011); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-12 (West 2011); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-303 (West 2011); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/209 (West 2011); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-11-6-1 (West 2011); IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.10 (West 2011); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 23-104a (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.050 (West 2011); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:202 (2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 655 (2011), amended by
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statutes use relatively broad language, such as the statute in
Colorado that permits a marriage to be solemnized "in
accordance with any mode of solemnization recognized by any
religious denomination."9 5 Several other statutes, on the other
hand, use more detailed and specific terminology, such as the
statute in Indiana which allows all of the following to solemnize
marriages:
(1) A member of the clergy of a religious organization (even
if the cleric does not perform religious functions for an
individual congregation), such as a minister of the gospel, a
priest, a bishop, an archbishop, or a rabbi.
(6) The Friends Church, in accordance with the rules of the
Friends Church.
(7) The German Baptists, in accordance with the rules of
their society.
(8) The Bahai faith, in accordance with the rules of the
Bahai faith.
(9) The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, in
accordance with the rules of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints.
(10) An imam of a masjid (mosque), in accordance with the
rules of the religion of Islam.96
2011 Me. Legis. Serv. (H.P. 120) (L.D. 138) (West); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-
406 (West 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, §§ 38-39 (West 2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.7 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 517.04, 517.18 (West
2011); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 93-1-17, 93-1-19 (West 2011); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.100
(West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-108 (2010);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 122.006, 122.062 (West 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 457:31, 457:31-b, 457:37 (2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-13 (West 2011); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 40-1-2, 40-1-3 (West 2011); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney
2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-03-09
(West 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.08 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 7 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106.120 (West 2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1503 (West 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-3-5 (West 2010); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-1-20 (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-30 (2011); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-301
(West 2011); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.202 (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-6
(West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 5144 (West 2011); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-23, 20-
26 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.050 (West 2011); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 48-2-401, 48-2-402 (West 2011); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 765.16 (West 2011); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 20-1-106 (West 2011).
95 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109(1) (West 2011).
96 IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-6-1 (West 2011). Oklahoma's statute is similar. It
allows "an ordained or authorized preacher or minister of the Gospel, priest or other
ecclesiastical dignitary of any denomination who has been duly ordained or
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A few statutes, however, use language that may be
considered less tolerant, such as the statute in South Carolina
that states: "Only ministers of the Gospel, Jewish rabbis, . . . and
the chief or spiritual leader of a Native American Indian entity
recognized by the South Carolina Commission for Minority
Affairs ... are authorized to administer a marriage ceremony in
this State."" According to this statute, it may be argued that
Buddhists, Hindus, Muslims, and other religions which officials
in South Carolina may not see as being "ministers of the Gospel"
are not legally eligible to solemnize marriages in the Palmetto
State."
While the particular language of an individual state's
solemnization statute-such as South Carolina's-may be
constitutionally questionable, some people believe that the very
practice of allowing religious authorities to solemnize legally
binding marriages is an unconstitutional entanglement of
government with religion.99 In analyzing this contention, it is
authorized by the church to which he or she belongs to preach the Gospel, or a rabbi
and who is at least eighteen (18) years of age" to solemnize marriages. OIA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 7(A) (West 2011). It also states: "Marriages between persons
belonging to the society called Friends, or Quakers, the spiritual assembly of the
Baha'is, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day [sic] Saints, which have no
ordained minister, may be solemnized by the persons and in the manner prescribed
by and practiced in any such society, church, or assembly." Id. § 7(D). Persons
belonging to The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints may be surprised to
learn that Oklahoma law considers them to "have no ordained minister," id., and
that none of their leaders apparently qualify "as a minister of the gospel, a priest,
[or] a bishop" under Indiana law. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-6-1(1) (West
2011), with IND. CODE ANN. tit. 31, § 31-11-6-1(9).
* S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-20 (2010).
98 Id.
9 See, e.g., Shanah D. Glick, The Agunah in the American Legal System:
Problems and Solutions, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 885, 888-89 (1992) ("By
allowing religion to enter the civil arena" when a marriage is performed, "the state
is . .. violating the Establishment Clause.... The state's framework of
marriage ... regulation fails both the second and third prong of the Lemon test and
is therefore unconstitutional. . . . [Tihe framework fosters an excessive entanglement
with religion by drawing the religious into the civil sphere. The state is entangled
because it grants secular power and authority to those with authority under
religious laws."); Janet R. Jakobsen, Queer Relations: A Reading of Martha
Nussbaum on Same-Sex Marriage, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 133, 149-52 (2010);
Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex-or Not
at All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 283-84 (2000); Scott, supra note 67, at 551-54; see also
Mary Anne Case, A Lot To Ask: Review Essay of Martha Nussbaum's From Disgust
to Humanity: Sexual Orientation and Constitutional Law, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER &
L. 89, 122-24 (2010).
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helpful to note that those who perform religious marriage
ceremonies are not themselves either actual or apparent agents
of the state. They do not, for instance, act on behalf of the state
or subject to its control.o Instead, they act solely on behalf of
their private religious affiliations and subject to the respective
dictates of each. The state, furthermore, does not manifest any
particular desire that religious leaders solemnize marriages on
its behalf; on the contrary, it simply agrees to recognize those
marriages which religious leaders solemnize as a result of the
independent choices of individual couples.101 By way of analogy,
just as private parties who create legally binding contracts do so
in their individual capacities and not as agents of the state, so
too do religious leaders who participate in the creation of legally
binding marital contracts act by virtue of their own authority and
without any semblance of state power.10 2 Consequently, a state's
recognition and enforcement of the actions of private parties does
not mean that the state somehow participated in or was involved
with those actions. 0 '
100 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) ("Agency is the fiduciary
relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to another
person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to
the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to
act.").
101 See id. § 2.01 ("An agent acts with actual authority when, at the time of
taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably
believes, in accordance with the principal's manifestations to the agent, that the
principal wishes the agent so to act.").
102 This matter is, therefore, distinguishable from the facts at issue in Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., where governmental power was bestowed upon religious
organizations. See 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (holding that delegating the power to
veto liquor licenses to religious organizations violated the Establishment Clause).
10 Many states have provisions in their solemnization statutes which, if strictly
enforced, could conceivably entangle the state with religion in an unconstitutional
manner. Alabama's statute, for instance, states: "Marriage may ... be solemnized by
the pastor of any religious society according to the rules ordained or custom
established by such society." ALA. CODE § 30-1-7(b) (2011) (emphasis added). North
Dakota's permits marriages to be solemnized by "any person authorized by the
rituals and practices of any religious persuasion." N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-03-09
(West 2009) (emphasis added); see also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1503(b) (West
2011) ("according to the rules and customs of the society"). Tennessee's provides: "In
order to solemnize the rite of matrimony, any such minister, preacher, pastor, priest,
rabbi or other spiritual leader must be ordained or otherwise designated in
conformity with the customs of a church, temple or other religious group or
organization; and such customs must provide for such ordination or designation by a
considered, deliberate, and responsible act." TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-301(a)(2) (West
2011) (emphasis added). And West Virginia's states: "A religious representative
1470 [Vol. 85:1451
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Nor does it mean that the state endorsed or sponsored those
actions. As already noted, whether a marriage is religiously
solemnized depends entirely upon the private choices of
individual couples. No state requires a civil marriage to be
religiously solemnized.04 Instead, each state permits parties to
choose to have their marriage religiously solemnized."o5 The
religious solemnization of a civil marriage can, therefore, be
reasonably attributed to private individuals rather than to the
government. 1 06
Given that the religious solemnization of a civil marriage
does not unavoidably signify state endorsement of religion or
require "excessive entanglement" of government with religion, it
authorized to celebrate the rites of marriage shall perform the ceremony of marriage
according to the rites and ceremonies of his or her religious denomination, church,
synagogue, spiritual assembly or religious organization and the laws of the State of
West Virginia." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-403 (West 2011) (emphasis added). Many
similar examples could be given. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-124(A)(1)
(2011) ("Duly licensed or ordained clergymen."); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.07(1) (West
2011) ("All regularly ordained ministers of the gospel or elders in communion with
some church . . . ."); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-6-1 (West 2011) ("The Friends Church,
['German Baptists,' 'Bahai faith,' 'Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,' or
'imam of a masjid (mosque),'] in accordance with the rules" pertaining to said
"Church," "society," "faith," or "religion"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 38 (West
2011) ("a duly ordained minister of the gospel in good and regular standing with his
church"). If a state were to begin interpreting religious doctrines so as to ensure that
the officiant at a marriage ceremony was actually "duly ordained," "in good
standing," or performed the ordinance "according to the rules ordained" by a religion,
then the state would likely be seen as excessively entangling itself in religion. For
more on state supervision of religious practices, see generally Elijah L. Milne,
Protecting Islam's Garden from the Wilderness: Halal Fraud Statutes and the First
Amendment, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL'Y 61 (2006).
104 See sources cited supra note 94.
105 Id.
'0 Cf Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 719 (2004) ("[Tlhe link between government
funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of
recipients."); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 650, 652 (2002) ("That [a]
program [providing state aid to private religious schools] was one of true private
choice, with no evidence that the State deliberately skewed incentives toward
religious schools, was sufficient for the program to survive scrutiny under the
Establishment Clause.... [Where a government aid program is neutral with
respect to religion, and provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who,
in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own
genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause.... The incidental advancement of a
religious mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably
attributable to the individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with
the disbursement of benefits.").
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
is unlikely that the mere practice of allowing states to solemnize
legally binding marriage is, without more, inconsistent with the
Establishment Clause.'0 7  Not only does the history of this
practice predate the Establishment Clause, but the United States
Supreme Court has repeatedly held that government may
accommodate religious practices and that "[a] law is not
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance
religion."os To say that the government may choose to
accommodate religious practices, however, is not to suggest that
it necessarily must always do so.109 For, as the Court noted in
Locke v. Davey, "there are some state actions permitted by the
Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise
Clause.""t0
o"Although a state may permit religious authorities to solemnize legal
marriages without violating the Establishment Clause, a state could conceivably
offend the Establishment Clause if it only allowed, say, leaders of majoritarian
Christian faiths to solemnize civil marriages. For a state to prefer one religion over
another in this manner would seem to be a classic violation of the principle of
neutrality which the Court has held to be central to the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. See sources cited supra note 79. It would also likely violate
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 1. This is why the South Carolina statute which was mentioned earlier may
potentially be problematic, for it appears on its face to prefer "ministers of the
Gospel, Jewish rabbis," and the "spiritual leader" of recognized "Native American
Indian entit[ies]" over and above the leaders of all other faiths. See supra text
accompanying notes 97-98. It appears, in other words, to be something other than
"neutral."
108 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 337 (1987); see Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970) ("[T]here is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality
which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference."); see also supra notes 24-26, 80-83 and accompanying text. This
reference to the longevity of the practice of allowing religions to perform legally
binding marriages should not be understood as suggesting that antiquity alone
ought to render a practice constitutional. As has already been noted, that is rarely, if
ever, the case. See supra note 83. Indeed, the history of the United States is replete
with examples of practices that were once widely established but which today cannot
be constitutionally countenanced, the most deplorable example of this undoubtedly
being human slavery.
10 See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718
(1981) ("The mere fact that the petitioner's religious practice is burdened by a
governmental program does not mean that an exemption accommodating his
practice must be granted.").
no 540 U.S. at 719.
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As mentioned earlier, the Court first directly addressed the
Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds v. United States, the late-
nineteenth century case regarding the prohibition of polygamy in
the territories."' Relying upon the dichotomy between opinions
and actions, the Court in that case interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause as stripping the government of power over "mere religious
belief and opinions" while concurrently leaving it "free to reach
actions" and practices.112 Over a century later, the Court refined
this initial interpretation in the case of Employment Division v.
Smith, wherein it held that "the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and
neutral law of general applicability."" 3  Just three years after
Smith, the Court further explained in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah that "[n]eutrality and general
applicability are interrelated," and that if a law fails to satisfy
this standard it must satisfy "strict scrutiny," which requires a
law to "be justified by a compelling governmental interest and [to
be] narrowly tailored to advance that interest.""' As the Court
also noted in City of Hialeah, if a law "targets religious
conduct ... or advances legitimate governmental interests only
against conduct with a religious motivation [it] will survive strict
scrutiny only in rare cases.""s
Given the Court's increasingly narrow interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause, some people fear that a state could force
religions opposed to same-sex unions to solemnize same-sex
marriages. Several additional people fret that a state could
111 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
112 Id. at 164, 166.
us Emp't. Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although the Court's distinction between beliefs and
actions is understandable, it seems difficult to square with the actual text of the
Free Exercise Clause, which admittedly seeks to protect the free exercise of religion.
The noun "exercise" does not appear to have ever been defined, interpreted,
understood, or used at anytime anywhere in the history of the English language as
referring to something unrelated to action. See OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(online ed. 2011), http://www.oed.com/viewlEntry/66088.
14 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993).
" Id. at 546.
116 See, e.g., Erin N. East, Comment, I Object: The RLUIPA as a Model for
Protecting the Conscience Rights of Religious Objectors to Same-Sex Relationships,
59 EMORY L.J. 259, 268-70 (2009) ("To date, no U.S. court has dealt with the issue of
whether ministers and public officials are required to solemnize same-sex marriages
against their religious beliefs. The dearth of case law in this area could be due to the
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condition its recognition of religiously solemnized marriages
upon, say, a religion's willingness to perform or recognize same-
sex marriages and similar unions.' And many more people
worry that anti-discrimination laws and other regulations could
impose various sanctions upon religions that refuse to recognize
same-sex unions or condone "nontraditional lifestyles."" While
each of these concerns may theoretically be possible, some appear
either more or less likely than others to be realized anytime soon,
if ever. To demonstrate this, a brief analysis regarding each of
these concerns in the free-exercise context follows.
First, as to the fear that a state could directly mandate that
religions perform same-sex marriages, the probability of this
occurring appears relatively low at present under the Court's
current, albeit somewhat debile, interpretation of the Free
fact that same-sex couples prefer to find officials who support same-sex marriage to
perform their ceremonies. However, ... conflicts still might arise in the future."); see
also JONATHAN GOLDBERG-HILLER, THE LIMITS TO UNION: SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
AND THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 244 n.32 (2002) ("One petitioner ... wrote, '[M]y
biggest concern of all is that [legalized same-sex marriage in Hawai'i] will lead to
forcing churches to perform these ceremonies or lose their [tax-exempt] status.' ")
(alteration in original); Erwin Chemerinsky, Judicial Opinions as Public Rhetoric,
97 CALIF. L. REV. 1763, 1763 (2009).
117 See, e.g., East, supra note 116, at 270 ("It is also possible that, since members
of the clergy are licensed to solemnize marriages on behalf of the state, state
legislatures could require them to perform same-sex marriages in order to keep their
licenses."); see also GOLDBERG-HILLER, supra note 116 ("The Mormon Church
unsuccessfully sued to intervene in the Baehr case because of a concern that
religious groups would be forced to sanction same-sex marriages or lose their
'licenses' to marry 'appropriate' couples.").
118 See, e.g., Daniel Avila, To Wed & Let Wed? The Intrusive Impact on
Dissenting Religious Belief & Practices Created by Same-Sex Marriages, 38 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 621, 621-24, 627-28 (2004) ("[SItate intrusion on religious employment
and other non-ritual policies will likely occur in the same-sex marriage
context .... ); Cain, supra note 65, at 48 ("The first advertisement that opponents of
same-sex marriage launched [in California] was one that said same-sex marriage
threatened to take away the tax-exempt status of California churches."); James M.
Donovan, Rock-Salting the Slippery Slope: Why Same-Sex Marriage Is Not a
Commitment to Polygamous Marriage, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 521, 532, 534 (2002) ("If by
this Arkes means that allowing same-sex marriage will force contrary believing
religionists to tolerate and recognize such marriages, he is right. That is the price of
living in a pluralistic society. . . . When (not if) gays and lesbians are recognized as
citizens fully entitled to the panoply of state protections offered to heterosexuals,
then Catholics, by their own terms, will be bound to respect those rights."); Fredric
J. Bold, Jr., Comment, Vows to Collide: The Burgeoning Conflict Between Religious
Institutions and Same-Sex Marriage Antidiscrimination Laws, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
179, 180-86 (2009); see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Peacemaking in the Culture
War Between Gay Rights and Religious Liberty, 95 IOWA L. REV. 747, 750-51 (2010).
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Exercise Clause. The religious solemnization of marriage is,
after all, a religious act, notwithstanding the fact that it may
have legal consequences. To require a religion to solemnize a
same-sex marriage could, then, be seen as tantamount to
requiring it to perform a religious act, such as baptism,
confirmation, communion, penance, unction, and ordination.
Laws compelling the performance of a religious act have typically
not fared well before the Supreme Court,"'9 while those which
have merely burdened the performance of such an act have often
done better.120 Thus it is that in Smith the Court once again
reaffirmed the general principle that "government may not
119 See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834-35 (1989)
(invalidating requirement that religiously-opposed person work on Sundays); Hobbie
v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 139-40 (1987) (invalidating
requirement that Seventh-day Adventist work on Saturdays); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 56-57 (1985) (invalidating state-mandated prayer in school); Thomas v.
Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-18, 720 (1981) (discussing
requirement that religiously-opposed person make armaments); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39, 41-43 (1980) (invalidating requirement that Ten Commandments be
posted in classrooms); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207, 219 (1972)
(invalidating requirement that Amish attend high school); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 399-400, 409-10 (1963) (invalidating requirement that Adventist work on
Saturdays); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 205, 223-25
(1963) (invalidating state-mandated Bible readings in school); Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421, 422, 436 (1962) (invalidating recital of state-composed prayer in school);
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489, 495-96 (1961) (invalidating requirement that
officeholders declare belief in God). But see Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 700-01
(1986) (upholding requirement that religiously-opposed person obtain social security
number); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 254-55, 259-61 (1982) (upholding
requirement that Amish pay social security taxes). Note, however, that many of
these cases did not actually concern the performance of an inherently religious act.
Rather, they compelled the performance of a religiously-prohibited act. See also Lyng
v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988) ("[Tlhis Court has
repeatedly held that indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not
just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment.").
120 See generally, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding ban on
funding religious education); Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493
U.S. 378 (1990) (upholding tax on selling religious materials); Emp't Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (discussing ban on peyote); Lyng, 485 U.S. 439 (upholding
construction of road at sacred site); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987)
(upholding ban on prisoners returning for prayer); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S.
503 (1986) (upholding military ban on Jews wearing yarmulkes); Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding ban on Mormon polygamy). But see Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (invalidating
ban on animal sacrifice); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating ban on
ministers running for office).
2011]1 1475
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
compel affirmation of religious belief."12 ' To compel a religion to
perform a same-sex marriage, however, would seem to do just
that, for the very performance of this act could reasonably be
seen as expressing a belief in its religious propriety.
While a law directly targeting the performance of religious
marriages is unlikely to survive constitutional scrutiny, a law
placing conditions upon the state's recognition of a religiously
solemnized marriage may have better prospects of survival. 2 2 As
explained earlier, the government is not necessarily required to
bestow legal recognition upon religiously solemnized
marriages.123 Given this reality, a state could conceivably enact a
neutral law of general applicability that states, for example:
"Notwithstanding any other provision in this statute, a person
who discriminates on the basis of sex, gender, or sexual
orientation is prohibited from solemnizing any marriage in this
state." Similarly, a state such as Louisiana, which permits an
"officiant" to "perform marriage ceremonies only after he
registers to do so" with a court clerk, might be able to enact a
neutral law of general applicability prohibiting or invalidating
the registration of any person who discriminates on the basis of
sex, gender, or sexual orientation. 24 To the extent laws such as
these are found to be neutral and of general applicability, they
are unlikely to run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause.125 But even
should they fail to be both neutral and of general applicability,
they may still be found constitutional under the Free Exercise
Clause if prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is held to be a "compelling governmental interest."126
121 Emp't Div., 494 U.S. at 877; see Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)
(plurality opinion) ("Compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice
of any form of worship is strictly forbidden.").
122 That is not, however, to say that such a law is likely to be actually enacted
any time soon given the presently prevailing political situation in the United States.
m See supra text accompanying notes 106-110.
124 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:204 (2011).
125 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. To state that such laws may not
violate the Free Exercise Clause is not to suggest that they may not violate other
provisions of the Constitution or that they should-or are likely to be-enacted. This
Article expresses no opinion on the advisability of banning or embracing same-sex
marriages.
126 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. As already noted, this Article
expresses no opinion on the merits of laws banning or embracing same-sex
marriages. Nor does it express an opinion on what constitutes a "compelling
governmental interest" in this context.
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In order to prevent scenarios such as those referred to in the
last two paragraphs from coming about, most jurisdictions in the
United States that perform same-sex marriages have enacted
statutes shielding and protecting religions and religious
leaders.12 7 A statute in Connecticut, for example, states: "No
member of the clergy authorized to join persons in
marriage .. . shall be required to solemnize any marriage ....
No church ... shall be required to participate in a ceremony
solemnizing a marriage in violation of the religious beliefs of that
church ... ."128 Likewise, a law in the District of Columbia
provides: "No . . . official of any religious society who is
authorized to solemnize or celebrate marriages shall be required
to solemnize or celebrate any marriage. Each religious society
has exclusive control over its own theological doctrine, teachings,
and beliefs regarding who may marry within that particular
religious society's faith."129 While statutes like these may provide
a degree of comfort to those religions that oppose same-sex
unions, the fact that such statutes might be necessary to secure
religious liberty in the first place may very well cause additional
discomfort to some.
As noted a moment ago, neutral laws of general applicability
imposing limitations or sanctions upon those who discriminate on
the basis of sex, gender, or sexual orientation are not likely to
run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause.'30 For this reason, many
people justly worry that anti-discrimination laws and other
regulations could conceivably serve as an indirect means of
compelling religious objectors to recognize same-sex unions or
condone homosexuality. They fear, for instance, that a religion
could lose its tax-exempt status for opposing a same-sex
127 The only apparent exceptions are Iowa and Massachusetts. But see Goodridge
v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 965 n.29 (Mass. 2003) ("Our decision in no
way limits the rights of individuals to refuse to marry persons of the same sex for
religious or any other reasons."). In fact, Iowa's marriage statute still states, "Only a
marriage between a male and a female is valid." IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.2(1) (West
2011), invalidated by Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009).
128 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-22b (West 2011). The statutes in New York and
Vermont are similar. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11(1) (McKinney 2011); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 18, § 5144(b) (West 2011).
129 D.C. CODE § 46-406(c)-(d) (2011). The statute in New Hampshire is similar.
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:37 (2011).
1"o Whether or not they are permissible under other provisions of the
Constitution is beyond the scope of this Article.
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initiative, that a religious school could be liable for expelling a
student for homosexual conduct, that a church could be
sanctioned for firing an employee in a same-sex relationship, and
that a religious organization could face legal consequences for
excluding a same-sex couple from its property."'1 While these
fears may or may not be realistic, and while such anti-
discrimination measures may or may not be constitutional, so
long as the relevant law is neutral and of general applicability, it
would seem unlikely to run afoul of the Court's current
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause.132
IV. RECOGNIZING MARRIAGE
While one might get the impression from the discussion thus
far that the contemporary debate over marriage is divided
between the religious and the non-religious, nothing could be
further from the truth. As was previously mentioned, people of
deep religious faith can be found in support of either side of the
controversy.13 3  In fact, several religious organizations in the
United States provide varying degrees of support for same-sex
marriage rights, including the American Baptist Churches
(USA), the Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), the Episcopal
Church, the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the
Metropolitan Community Church, the Presbyterian Church
(USA), the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), the United
131 See sources cited supra notes 116-118; cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States,
461 U.S. 574 (1983) (depriving private religious university of its tax-exempt status
because of race discrimination notwithstanding Free Exercise Clause). See generally
Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage Threatens Religious Liberty,
30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 939 (2007) (describing various conflicts with religion in
connection with same-sex marriage); Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage and Religious
Liberty: Comparative Law Problems and Conflict of Laws Solutions, 12 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 315 (2010) (describing various conflicts with religion in connection with same-
sex marriage); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty:
Life After Prop 8, 14 NEXUS 101 (2009) (describing various conflicts with religion in
connection with same-sex marriage).
132 That is not, however, to suggest that it may not offend other provisions of the
Constitution, such as the rights to freedom of speech and association under the First
Amendment. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
133 See supra text accompanying note 65.
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Church of Christ, the Unitarian Universalist Association, the
Reform Jewish movement, and the Reconstructionist Jewish
movement.'34
Given that many religions and people of religious faith
support same-sex unions, some people claim that a state's refusal
to recognize same-sex marriages violates the free-exercise rights
of those individuals and religious organizations who support
same-sex marriage.135 As has already been discussed, however,
the government is not necessarily required to validate
religiously-solemnized marriages, and where the relevant law is
neutral and of general applicability, it is unlikely to be found
wanting under the Free Exercise Clause.136  In any event, a
state's refusal to legally recognize same-sex marriages does not
mean that it prohibits religions from performing extralegal
marriage ceremonies. Nor does it mean that anyone is compelled
to perform a religious act. Instead, it simply means that the
state is itself unwilling to perform an act, namely, to recognize
same-sex marriages. This being the case, a state's refusal to
recognize same-sex marriages is not likely to violate the Free
Exercise Clause, because, as the Supreme Court has held, "[t]he
134 See James D. Davis, Where Many Religions Stand on Gay Issues, SUN-
SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), May 2, 2010, at 7G; Disciples Church Votes To Allow
Same-Sex Unions, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Dec. 14, 2002, at 5G; Michael Paulson,
Episcopal Diocese Sets Same-Sex Wedding Ban, Bos. GLOBE, May 13, 2004, at Al;
Jay Tokasz, A Blessed Union, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 25, 2009, at C1.
1 See, e.g., MARK STRASSER, ON SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS, AND THE
RULE OF LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AT THE CROSSROADS 122-24
(2002); Ariel Y. Graff, Free Exercise and Hybrid Rights: An Alternative Perspective on
the Constitutionality of Same-Sex Marriage Bans, 29 U. HAW. L. REV. 23, 24, 39
(2006) ("the refusal to validate religious same-sex marriages under state laws
constitutes a burden on religious exercise"); Kubasek & Glass, supra note 67, at 25;
Mark Strasser, The Alleged Harms of Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage, in WHAT'S
THE HARM?, supra note 90, at 27, 37; Mark Strasser, Book Review, Same-Sex
Marriage and Religious Liberty: Emerging Conflicts, 25 J.L. & RELIGION 305, 307
(2009) (reviewing a book about LBGT issues including same-sex marriage); see also
Isaak, supra note 67 ("In recognizing opposite-sex religious unions as valid
marriages, but declining to extend the same recognition to same-sex religious
unions, the state discriminates against those religions that perform same-sex
marriages."). In response to the argument that prohibitions of same-sex marriage
violate the Establishment Clause, see supra Part II.
1' See supra text accompanying notes 109-110, 123-132. Whether it may
violate the Equal Protection Clause or any other provision of the Constitution
besides the Religion Clauses is beyond the scope of this Article.
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Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the
Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that
comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens.""'
V. PRIVATIZING MARRIAGE
Over nine hundred years ago, the Catholic Church officially
declared marriage to be one of seven holy sacraments.3 s
Throughout the ensuing centuries, this vision of marriage has
become increasingly unpopular, as more and more individuals
and societies have come to see marriage as a mere mortal
contract.13 9  With the decline of the sacramental model of
marriage and the corresponding ascent of the "contractarian"
model of marriage, the wants and wishes of individual adults-as
opposed to those of their country, community, companion, and
children-have seemingly become what matters most for many.
It should come as no surprise, then, that as personal privacy,
passions, and "private parts" gain greater legal protection, a
movement has also begun to privatize marriage.4 0
"I Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986) (emphasis added); see Lyng v. Nw.
Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) ("Whatever may be the
exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and
the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs, the location of the line
cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious
objector's spiritual development."). Elsewhere this author has argued that laws
banning polygamy may be distinguished from laws banning same-sex marriage in
that anti-polygamy laws often punish polygamists who enter into purely private
religious marriages which do not purport to be legally binding under civil, as
opposed to religious, laws. See Milne, supra note 41, at 274-76, 285-86. In the wake
of the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating anti-
sodomy laws), laws punishing those who enter into purely private same-sex
marriages are unlikely to be upheld, while anti-polygamy laws continue to
encompass even individuals who enter into extralegal polygamist unions. As a
result, "laws forbidding polygamy can also prevent polygamists from practicing their
religious beliefs," while laws forbidding same-sex marriages may not necessarily do
so. Milne, supra note 41, at 285-86. But see Mark Strasser, Marriage, Free Exercise,
and the Constitution, 26 LAW & INEQ. 59, 102-03 & n.317 (2008).
138 See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text. The other six sacraments are
"Baptism, Confirmation, Holy Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, [and] Orders."
Daniel Kennedy, Sacraments, in 13 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1912), available
at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13295a.htm.
139 WITTE, supra note 12, at 25-26; see supra Part II.
140 See generally MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita
Bernstein ed., 2006) (containing several articles advocating the privatization of
marriage).
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Efforts to privatize marriage are, in essence, efforts to
abolish civil marriage and replace it with something more starkly
contractual, such as a civil union. 14 Given that civil unions are
considered to be both genderless and wholly secular, some people
believe that replacing civil marriages with civil unions would,
among other things, decrease controversy over same-sex
marriage, ensure the separation of church and state, and provide
individuals with greater freedom to define and customize their
private relationships.1 4 2 While the government would no longer
perform civil marriages, private individuals and religions would
remain free to define the term "marriage" however they want and
to perform "marriages" however they wish. 143 The government
would leave the meaning and regulation of "marriage" entirely in
private hands and focus its attention on regulating and enforcing
civil unions and other legal contracts. 144
Although the privatization of marriage might bring about
some positive results, it does not appear that one of those would
be to strengthen families. 45 Regardless of whether a family
consists of a same-sex couple, an opposite-sex couple, or any
other conceivable arrangement, the abolition of legal marriage
intuitively seems likely to lead to more sexual infidelity, more
familial instability, more single-parent families, more fatherless
children, and more moral meaninglessness. While it has been
argued that privatizing marriage would protect religious liberty,
religious beliefs and values seem unlikely to be effectively
transmitted to future generations where already-tottering family
structures are necessarily rendered even less sturdy when their
underlying foundations are essentially blasted out from
underneath them. In addition, as "family circles" are forced to fit
into "contractarian" "square holes," their natures are likely to be
further transformed and commodified-turned into commodities
1I See Daniel A. Crane, A "Judeo-Christian" Argument for Privatizing Marriage,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221, 1250-51 (2006); Edward A. Zelinksy, Deregulating
Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1161, 1163 (2006).
14 See, e.g., Scott, supra note 67, at 553-54; Crane, supra note 141; Zelinksy,
supra note 141, at 1179-80.
1' Crane, supra note 141, at 1250-52; Zelinksy, supra note 141, at 1175.
1" Crane, supra note 141, at 1250-52; Zelinsky, supra note 141, at 1163.
14 A full analysis of proposals to privatize marriage is beyond the scope of this
Article.
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or conceived of in market terms-so as to more appropriately
conform to the essential purposes of most mere contracts. 14 6
Thus, in the end (of marriage), it may be that neither religion nor
society is likely to prosper as a result of marriage's demise.
CONCLUSION
The history of marriage in America, like that of religion, has
frequently involved controversy, division, and transformation. It
should be no surprise, then, that the modern debate over same-
sex marriage and religious liberty has frequently divided, as well
as transformed, many of the nation's homes, temples, and public
places. As this debate and its accompanying drama continue to
unfold, one can only hope that its final end will not be the
wreckage of many more families and relationships than those
which each side is apparently seeking to create and protect. For,
regardless of what may or may not ultimately be considered
constitutional, the deterioration of the family unit and the
weakening of the home are unlikely to strengthen many churches
or states.
14 For further readings on the theory of commodification, see generally
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE
(Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005).
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